“Zenith” has changed the West. Semak is the head coach. Sergei Semak appointed head coach of Zenit Head coach of the football club Zenit
June 1987
USSR Champion 1984
USSR Cup Winner 1985
July 1, 1989
November 4, 1996
November 22, 1998
November 24, 1998 -
April 25, 2000
May 31, 2000 -
July 5, 2002
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2001
Finalist of the Cup of Russia 2001/02
August 26, 2002, and. O.
November 17, 2002
May 3, 2006
Premier League Cup Winner 2003
August 10, 2009
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2008
UEFA Cup Winner 2007/08
UEFA Super Cup Winner 2008
October 3 -
December 11, 2009
March 11, 2014
Champion of Russia 2010
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2011
Champion of Russia 2011/12
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2012
Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2012/13
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2013
May 21, 2016
Champion of Russia 2014/15
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2015
Cup of Russia 2015/16
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2015/16
** Lasin in September 1950 replaced K. Lemeshev in away matches, Kornev replaced Zonin in August-October 1977, Davydov replaced Byshovets in October 1998. The match statistics are credited to Lemeshev, Zonin and Byshovets, for Kornev they are highlighted separately for clarity.
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Notes
Links
| Trainers FC Zenit St. Petersburg | |
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P. Butusov (1935) Filippov (1936-1938) Ivin (acting) (1938) Egorov (1938-1940) Filippov (1940) K. Lemeshev (1944-1945) M. Butusov (1946) Talanov (1946-1948) K. Lemeshev (1949-1950) Lasin (1950-1951) V. Lemeshev (1952-1954) Lyukshinov (1954-1955) Alov (1956-1957) Zharkov (1956-1960) Bondarenko (1960) Eliseev (1961-1964) Fedorov (1964-1966) Alov (1967) Fallan (1968-1970) Goryansky (1970-1972) Zonin (1973-1977) Morozov (1977-1982) Sadyrin (1983-1987) Golubev (1987) Zavidonov (1988-1989) Golubev (1989) Skates (1990) Bulavin (1990) Morozov (1991) Melnikov (1992-1994) Sadyrin (1995-1996) Byshovets (1997-1998) Davydov (1998-2000) Morozov (2000-2002) Biryukov (acting) (2002) ( |
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| Media | |
| Other | |
| Seasons | |
An excerpt characterizing the List of head coaches of FC Zenit (St. Petersburg)
If the commanders were guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, as it should have been clear to Napoleon, that, having gone two thousand miles and accepted the battle with the probable accident of losing a quarter of the army, he was going to certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that, accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, as clear as it is that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change.When the opponent has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately in relation to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand; a hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to a hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If it is said that by occupying Moscow he thought he would end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is much evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, knew the danger of his extended position, knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw in what position the Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate.
Giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later summed up the intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the generals, who, of all the involuntary tools of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures.
The ancients left us models of heroic poems in which the heroes are the whole interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time this kind of history has no meaning.
To another question: how the battles of Borodino and the Shevardino battles preceding it were given - there is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the case as follows:
The Russian army, as if in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for itself for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin.
The Russians allegedly fortified this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, on the very spot where the battle took place.
In front of this position, a fortified advanced post on the Shevardinsky barrow was allegedly put up to observe the enemy. On the 24th, Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it; On the 26th, he attacked the entire Russian army, which was in position on the Borodino field.
So the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter will easily be convinced of.
The Russians did not look for a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not stop at any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a popular battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the former positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was given) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, guessing, one would point with a pin on the map.
The Russians not only did not fortify the position of the Borodino field to the left at a right angle from the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812 did they think that the battle could take place on this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications in this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not completed on the 26th; secondly, the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt serves as proof: the Shevardinsky redoubt, in front of the position on which the battle was taken, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, were all efforts exhausted and six thousand people lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, the proof that the position on which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written hastily after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the battle of Borodino were written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander in chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as an advanced post (whereas it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-selected position, while it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.
The case, obviously, was like this: the position was chosen along the Kolocha River, which crosses the main road not at a straight line, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was in Shevardin, the right flank was near the village of Novy and the center was in Borodino, at the confluence of the Kolocha and Vo rivers. yn. This position, under the cover of the Kolocha River, for the army, whose goal is to stop the enemy moving along the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious to anyone who looks at the Borodino field, forgetting how the battle took place.
Napoleon, having left for Valuev on the 24th, did not see (as the stories say) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodin (he could not see this position, because it was not there) and did not see the advanced post of the Russian army, but stumbled in the pursuit of the Russian rearguard on the left flank of the position of the Russians, on the Shevardinsky redoubt, and unexpectedly for the Russians transferred troops through Kolocha. And the Russians, not having time to enter into a general battle, retreated with their left wing from the position they intended to take, and took up a new position, which was not foreseen and not fortified. Having crossed to the left side of Kolocha, to the left of the road, Napoleon moved the entire future battle from right to left (from the side of the Russians) and transferred it to the field between Utitsa, Semenovsky and Borodino (in this field, which has nothing more advantageous for the position than any another field in Russia), and on this field the whole battle took place on the 26th. In rough form, the plan for the proposed battle and the battle that took place will be as follows:
If Napoleon had not left on the evening of the 24th for Kolocha and had not ordered to attack the redoubt immediately in the evening, but had begun the attack the next day in the morning, then no one would have doubted that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of our position; and the battle would have taken place as we expected it to. In that case, we would probably have defended the Shevardino redoubt, our left flank, even more stubbornly; they would attack Napoleon in the center or on the right, and on the 24th there would be a general battle in the position that was fortified and foreseen. But since the attack on our left flank took place in the evening, following the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the battle of Gridneva, and since the Russian military leaders did not want or did not have time to start a general battle on the 24th evening, the first and main action of Borodinsky the battle was lost on the 24th and, obviously, led to the loss of the one that was given on the 26th.
After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, by the morning of the 25th we found ourselves without a position on the left flank and were forced to bend back our left wing and hastily strengthen it anywhere.
But not only did the Russian troops stand only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications on August 26, the disadvantage of this situation was further increased by the fact that the Russian military leaders, not recognizing a completely accomplished fact (the loss of a position on the left flank and the transfer of the entire future battlefield from right to left ), remained in their stretched position from the village of Novy to Utitsa and, as a result, had to move their troops from right to left during the battle. Thus, during the entire battle, the Russians had twice the weakest forces against the entire French army, directed at our left wing. (The actions of Poniatowski against Utitsa and Uvarov on the right flank of the French constituted actions separate from the course of the battle.)
The official website of the blue-white-blue talk about all the assistants to the new head coach of Zenit.
Alexander Nizelik, coach
Alexander Nizelik was born on May 24, 1985 in Smolensk. A graduate of the St. Petersburg football school "Dynamo", Nizelik graduated from the philological faculty of St. Petersburg State University and the University of Lisbon. In 2010, Alexander joined the coaching staff of Luciano Spalletti, after which in 2012 he was appointed assistant to Fabio Capello in the Russian national team. Since 2014, he has worked as a trainer at Gazprom-Academy. At the end of 2015, together with Sergei Semak, he moved to Ufa, where he became an assistant to the head coach of the Bashkir team. In June 2018 he returned to Zenit.
Igor Simutenkov, coach
Igor Vitalievich Simutenkov was born on April 3, 1973 in Moscow. He started playing football at the age of 8 at the Smena school. Simutenkov's playing career began at Dynamo Moscow, playing for which in 1994 Igor became the top scorer of the Russian championship, scoring 21 goals in 28 matches. At the end of a successful season for himself, the striker moved to Italy and began to play for Regina. As part of the Italian team, Simutenkov played 97 matches in which he scored 20 goals. In 1998, Simutenkov moved to Bologna, and a year later he moved to the Spanish Tenerife. In 2002, the football player continued his career in America, signing a contract with the Kansas City Wizards MLS club. In the US, he spent three seasons, with him the team reached the MLS playoffs every time. In 2005, Simutenkov returned to Russia, signing a contract with Rubin, but due to an injury, he played only one match for Kazan. He spent 2006 in Dynamo Voronezh, after the end of the season he ended his playing career.
Igor Simutenkov played 20 matches for the Russian national team and scored 9 goals. Simutenkov's coaching career began in 2007 at the Torpedo-RG club, which played in the West zone of the second division of the Russian championship. From August 2007 to December 2009, Igor Vitalyevich headed the youth team of Russia, born in 1993. He joined Zenit on January 1, 2010, joining the coaching staff of Luciano Spalletti. On July 1, 2015, he headed the youth squad of blue-white-blue, with whom he worked for two years, after which he was returned to the main team and appointed assistant to Roberto Mancini.
Anatoly Tymoshchuk, coach
Anatoly Alexandrovich Tymoshchuk was born on March 30, 1979 in Lutsk, Ukraine, and began his career in the local Volyn. In 1998, he moved to Shakhtar Donetsk, where he played 326 matches and scored 39 goals, became a three-time champion of Ukraine, the owner of three Cups and the Super Cup of the country. In 2007 he joined Zenit. As part of the team, Tymoshchuk became the champion of Russia, won the country's Super Cup, UEFA Cup and Super Cup. On July 1, 2009, Anatoly signed a contract with Bayern Munich, where in four years he played 132 matches, scored 6 goals, became a two-time German champion, two-time winner of the National Cup, two German Super Cups and won the UEFA Champions League. In 2013 he returned to Zenit and won the Russian Championship. For five seasons as part of the blue-white-blue Tymoshchuk played 150 matches in which he scored 18 goals and gave 5 assists.
The midfielder completed his playing career in Kazakhstan's Kairat, where he won the country's Cup and Super Cup in a year and a half. In March 2016, Anatoly joined the Zenit coaching staff.
Mikhail Biryukov, goalkeeping coach
The best goalkeeper of the USSR in 1984, the long-term captain of Zenit and the idol of Leningrad fans, Biryukov entered the field until the age of 42, and two years later, at the invitation of Yuri Andreevich Morozov, he entered the blue-white-blue coaching staff. As an acting head coach, Mikhail Yuryevich led the blue-white-blue team for a short time. This happened shortly after Morozov left his post for health reasons. Under Biryukov, Zenit played only two months, dropped to 8th place in the table, and as a result, the coach filed a letter of resignation.
Subsequently, Mikhail Yuryevich again returned to work at the club, but this time he focused on the education of goalkeepers. Among his wards are Vyacheslav Malafeev, Yuri Lodygin, Mikhail Kerzhakov and many others. Mikhail Biryukov is the only one from Zenit who was involved in the first five championship titles - as a player (1984) and as a coach (2007, 2010, 2012, 2015).
Ivan Carminati, fitness trainer
Ivan Carminati was born on September 13, 1954 in Parma. The specialist began his coaching career at Lazio Rome, where he worked from 1997 to 2000. In 2001, he became the physical training coach for England. In 2005, he began working with Roberto Mancini and then joined the coaching staffs of Inter, Manchester City and Galatasaray. In the summer of 2017, he joined Zenit.
Andrea Scanavino, fitness trainer
Andrea Scanavino was born on March 3, 1973 in Turin. From 1998 to 2010 he worked as a physical training coach at Juventus. Spent the 2010/11 season at Sampdoria, from July 2011 to 2017 he worked at Inter. In the summer of 2017, he joined Zenit.
Maria Burova, fitness trainer
Maria Burova was born on June 11, 1985 in Moscow. She graduated from the Russian State Institute of Physical Culture with a degree in Physical Education Coach. In 2006, Maria began working at Lokomotiv Moscow, where she went through all the stages, from the children's academy to the main team. In 2015, Burova headed the club's sports medicine center. Two years later, Maria joined the coaching staff of Sergei Semak at Ufa, and from June 2018 she began working at Zenit. 
Isaac Serrano, fitness coach
Isaac Serrano Vivancos was born in the Catalan city of Esparreguera. He graduated from the Ramon Llull University in Barcelona, after which he continued his studies and work at the University of Basic Sciences in Murcia. Since 2010, he changed his place of work to the University of Lleida, where he practiced and was engaged in teaching. In 2016, he joined the blue-white-blue coaching staff.
Had one of the most disastrous seasons in recent history. For the first time in ten years, the team was left without medals in the Russian Football Championship, where it finished only in fifth place. It was worse only in 2005, when blue-white-blue remained sixth.
A year ago, the club's management from the banks of the Neva spent millions on transfers and an invitation to the eminent Italian as head coach. The bet didn't work. Mister could not prove himself in the Russian club and went to pull the national team of his country out of the swamp.
Tired of spending that does not live up to expectations, Zenit decided to invite a Russian specialist to the post of mentor of the team. The club was headed by Sergei. Except for emergency measures in the form of a three-month coming to the post in 2009, who then worked with a double, then
Zenit will have a Russian coach as a full-fledged mentor for the first time since 2002.
The agreement with 42-year-old Semak is designed for two years with the possibility of extension for another one. The young specialist noted that it was an honor and pleasure for him to work with the eminent club.
“Of course, it was a great honor for me to even be among the candidates for this position, and to receive an invitation is a very honorable and pleasant thing.
At the same time, I understand how difficult and difficult it will be, there is a lot of work ahead, you need to immediately take up your duties and slowly put the issues that are now in order, ”Semak said.
The specialist spent the previous year and a half at Ufa, which became the first club where he worked as a head coach. Under his leadership, the team from the capital of Bashkiria reached the Europa League for the first time in its history, finishing sixth in the RFPL season that ended. The team got a ticket to the European tournament after the owner of the Russian Cup "Tosno" could not pass the licensing in.
“Today I am very happy. I would like to thank Ufa, which gave me a chance to get a concrete experience.
Well, my family and I are happy to return to the city, which managed to become our home, ”said Semak.
Semak's career is developing almost perfectly.
As a player, he made his debut very early and became one of the few athletes who managed to score a goal in the elite division of Russian football under 18 years old.
After a season at Asmaral, Semak spent 11 years at CSKA, becoming a real red and blue legend of the club. Having scored the famous hat-trick against PSG in the Champions League match, the football player received an invitation to the Parisian team, where he could not prove himself to the fullest, as a rule, remaining on the bench. Then there were two seasons in FC Moscow, and three in each and Zenit.
With teams from St. Petersburg and Kazan, as well as with the Moscow army team, Semak became the champion of Russia.
Currently, he is the only one who managed to win the Premier League with three different clubs.
Semak's performances for the Russian national team deserve special attention.
It was Sergey who was the captain of the team that won the bronze medals of the 2008 European Championship.
At that tournament, Semak performed the most difficult goal pass through himself, after which he scored the only goal against the Greek national team, and the meeting ended with the team's victory with a score of 1: 0.
On account of the athlete and one of the most important goals in the history of "Zenith". In 2012, in the first match of the 1/8 finals of the Champions League against the Portuguese side Befniki, he put his team ahead with a heel strike. True, in the sum of two meetings, the blue-white-blue still lost (3:2, 0:2).
After completing his playing career, Semak worked in the coaching staff of Zenit in 2013-2016. Once he was even the acting head coach of the St. Petersburg team, under his leadership Zenit played two matches - in the national championship they lost to CSKA (0: 1), and then in the second leg of the 1/8 finals of the Champions League, they defeated the German Borussia away from Dortmund (2:1), which was not enough to reach the quarterfinals (the St. Petersburg team lost the first match with a score of 2:4).
Semak also has experience of working with the Russian national team, of which he was a member of the headquarters in 2014-2016. First, the specialist was an assistant, and then - Leonid Slutsky.
"Zenith" will be the first serious challenge of a specialist. The last two blue-white-blue coaches - Mancini and the Romanians did not stay in office for more than a year. It remains only to wait and see how the first Russian specialist in many years will do in the “execution” position.
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The list of candidates for Zenit coaches is not final
On Monday, the leadership of the St. Petersburg club reduced the shortlist of applicants for the vacant post of head coach after the resignation of Roberto Mancini from five to three. But who has been eliminated? And is the list of potential successors of the Italian limited to the originally announced surnames?
SPEND LESS, EARN MORE
Zenit itself, we recall, on the eve of the meeting of the board of directors in the office of Gazprom, named Sergey Semak, Maurizio Sarri, Paulo Fonseca, Marcelo Gallardo and Jorge Sampaoli as candidates. The club even held a fan vote on social networks to find out which head coach the people prefer. According to the results of the poll, “his” Semak was expected to win (63.8 percent of the vote). Next came Italy's Sarri (19.8), Portugal's Fonseca (6.4), Argentina's Sampaoli (6.1) and Gallardo (3.9). And after the board of directors, which was attended by Semak and was sharply criticized by Alexei Miller, the president of Zenit, Sergey Fursenko, received information about the elimination of two participants from the "race". True, without the indication of surnames.
Articles | The best is Fonseca, but Semak will be chosen: who will become the new coach of Zenit
Until the final decision is made, it's time to open a guessing game: who was crossed out and who is still being considered. But how do you compare specialists so different in age, experience, number of titles and transfer requests? The Zenit shortlist again caused an outside observer to feel the absence of a coherent medium-term strategy. In recent years, every off-season it has been formed in a hurry, under the chosen coach, and not vice versa, as it should be. And each time she was easily abandoned in order to re-rake the rubble after the next resignation. In such circumstances, participants in the struggle for the chair of the head coach of Zenit were usually measured by pomposity or popularity, and not by the number of professional merit within the framework of criteria clearly formulated by management.
And yet the situation at Zenith is changing. Conversations with people who are in close cooperation with the club convince us that they do not intend to step on the old rake in St. Petersburg. At the board of directors, a general line was drawn: first, decide on the principles of development for the next few years - and already choose a coach for them.
The basic rule of the new Zenith is to spend less and earn more. From this point of view, Semak is an ideal candidate. Obviously, the salary of the still head coach of Ufa will be at least five times less than that which Sarri or Fonseca will agree to. Conditions like “waiting for those who score, and therefore expensive attackers,” Semak, answering questions from Gazprom bosses, clearly did not put forward. And Sergei Bogdanovich has a second powerful trump card. In the summer, not only Artem Dzyuba and Oleg Shatov, but also a dozen other players (Robert Mack, Ibragim Tsallagov, Ernani, and so on) will return from rent to Zenit. Semak knows all of them very well from his work in the coaching staffs of Luciano Spalletti and Andre Villas-Boas. And, therefore, it will be easier for him to put together a combat-ready team from the available resources.
SEMAK, EXPANSION AND LAWYER
Therefore, those who do not believe in the 42-year-old Russian coach just on the basis that Zenit is not an experimental training ground are wrong. The situation has changed radically. As part of the new development concept, spending under 100 million euros and distributing 17 people on loan for the sake of fifth place and the third consecutive flight past the Champions League became more of an experiment (and a bold one at that). It turns out that Semak can be congratulated in advance on his appointment? Still no.
Mancini was disgraced.
The Italian coach burst into St. Petersburg with a dashing goal from Daler Kuzyaev and super football from Sebastian Driussi. The stands were inspired: the new president brought in a champion manager who reveals the Russian youth and selects the right legionnaires. Around - a chic stadium. Ahead is a warm-up victory in the Premier League before the comeback to the Champions League. On the way we will grab another European Cup. Finally, everything will be fine. Yeah.
Mancini interrupted the stinking aftertaste from Lucescu's attack. The driven Argentine striker has turned into a second-rate Argentinean diaspora, and it is difficult to imagine such an unsystematic use of Kuzyaev’s talent even under substances. The turn was finally finished off by the castling of Dziuba to Zabolotny. The latter also added fuel to the trolls - a debut goal in a useless () match against a comatose SKA. If anything, even Erokhin put poker there.
But the reaction of the club to the disaster is extremely adequate. Fursenko warned the hostilities by early dismissal of Roberto, and chooses a new coach together with the people. Zenit announced the shortlist of candidates through the millionth fan at Krestovsky - it's beautiful. And then, who from this list should be entrusted with the command. It's farsighted.
Sergey Semak
pros. Sergey Bogdanovich is a self-evident choice. "Zenith" does not need trophies and high-profile transfers: first you need to wipe the dirt from your own emblem. Once the most sincere team in the league turned into a money bag. Own pupils and just Russian guys are knocking out the team with scandals, and mercenaries take their place. Fans have forgotten when a footballer made his way to the base straight from the academy. The club formed a strange connection with politics. The only bright spot is Tymoshchuk's hairstyle on the bench. If Semak appears next to her, a good image can be restored.
There is no doubt about his humanity and orientation. Sergei will find a common language even with the cormorants at Krestovsky. He will not harm or merge ahead of time, like Lucescu with Mancini. He will not put the Russian guy under dubious legionnaires and will definitely fit in for the team in front of the judges. Zenit knew that the fans would choose Semak and made the right move, appointing him, as it were, with the hands of the fans. With him, it will not be shameful to root for the Petersburgers again. Now this is the most important thing.
Minuses. But, probably, it will be necessary to drown for Semakov's "Zenith" through defeats. The result of the young coach in Ufa is extremely worthy in terms of price-quality ratio. But managing a roster with spoiled stars on a win-it-all mission is another matter. This requires either hypertalent (like Zidane) or experience. Semak has neither one nor the other. But then again - are victories really that important?
Appointment Probability: almost certainly
pros. Zenit fails so much with foreign coaches that taking on a new foreigner = unleashing a cold war with the fans. But Sarri is almost the only coach in the world whose authority will make Petersburgers forget about passports and citizenship for at least half a year. His schemes at Napoli are openly admired by Guardiola and Mourinho, and the name can attract really cool players to Krestovsky. For example, Mertens or Jorginho.
Minuses. Maurizio is insanely expensive. He boldly hinted at his desire to leave Naples, automatically lining up a line of superclubs for his labor. Chelsea is trying more actively than the rest - in order to recapture the Italian from Abramovich, you need to lay out a really dangerous amount of money. In the event of poor results (no one is insured), it will be impossible to explain the numbers in Sarri's contract. Then the cold war will become nuclear.
Appointment Probability: first candidate after Semak
Jorge Sampaoli
pros. In the 2016/17 season, Sampaoli and Conte brought the three-back scheme back to life. The Argentinean's Sevilla rolled into the Champions League, and the coach's own shares skyrocketed. Jorge was immediately recruited by the Argentina national team. Surely the last World Cup for Lionel Messi is a serious matter. The quality of Sampaoli is also proved by the fact that the Andalusians crawled down after his departure. This year, the peak of Sevilla is the defeat of Barcelona in the final of the Copa del Rey.
Minuses. The talent of the Argentinean is undeniable. But there is no fundamental difference in the class between Sampaoli, Spalletti and even Mancini. The choice of Jorge is another attempt to get trophies in the shortest way, and not to build a long-term project through thorns to the stars. If Fursenko again falls for the red carpet strategy, then Sampaoli may not leave Russia after the World Cup.
Appointment Probability: very unlikely
Paulo Fonseca and Marcelo Gallardo
Minuses. These characters have no clear advantages. What could be dumber than poaching the Shakhtar coach almost immediately after Lucescu? To call a no-name from River Plate for a crowd of faded and unloved Argentines. It is pointless to paint further. Let's just hope that these guys are not really on the shortlist of St. Petersburg. And their names in the voting - another self-irony of "Zenith". The blue-white-blues have complete order with her.
Appointment Probability: tends to zero
